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Abstract 
The worldwide increases in food prices during 2007-2008 period has led many countries to 
set up fund to support agricultural producers through credits and subsidies systems. The 
government of Mali, since 2008, has adopted a strategy focused on inputs supply to facilitate 
farmers’ access to fertilizers and pesticides to ensure food security in rural area. The aim of 
this study is to analyze the link between access to these credits, land allocation behavior and 
the degree of commercialization of rural farmers in Mali.  We adopt an instrumental variable 
method to test the effect of credit access on land allocation for different types of crops 
namely: food crops, semi-commercial crops and purely commercial crops. We also examine 
the impact of credit on cash earning from the sales of agricultural products. This amount cash 
earning being moreover considered as a good indicator of degree of commercialization or 
degree of market participation. Our estimations results show that access to credit strongly 
encourages the development of cash crops. Beyond simple access, we find that the amount of 
credit has a nonlinear effect on land allocation. We also find that credit appears as a factor of 
increase in the degree of commercialization of agricultural products. 
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Introduction  
According to FAO, the agriculture represents about 30 to 60% of GDP in the Least Developed 
Countries and employs between 40 to 90% of the active population. This agricultural sector 
still the main source of foreign exchange reserves in three quarters of these countries and 
provides most of the subsistence food and income for rural populations. However this sector 
remains confronted with many constraints mainly in Africa region where two thirds of this 
continent face drought risks due to instability of rainfall and its uneven distribution in space 
and time (FAO, 1996). Weather conditions are important factors in the excessive volatility of 
agricultural production. Apart from these climatic hazards, land degradation and fertility loss 
are recognized to be the main factors limiting agricultural productivity. The deterioration of 
soil fertility resulting from population pressure leads to a reduction in fallow time and results 
in permanent use of land. These behavioral changes in the modes of agricultural operations 
have not been sufficiently accompanied by intensive use of means of production to offset 
losses of soil nutrients. For examples according to the World Bank, the intensity of fertilizer 
use in sub-Saharan Africa are only 12.5 kg / hectare against 89.6 in average in Latin America 
and 106.7 in Southeast Asia. (World Development Indicators, 2007). Moreover, Sanchez and 
Leasky (1996) show that the nutrient deficits of agricultural land have accumulated over the 
years and are evaluated approximately to 700 kg / ha of nitrogen, 100 kg for phosphorus for 
100 million of hectares in sub-Saharan Africa between 1965 and 1995. These accumulations 
of deficits highlight the vulnerability of subsistence farmers in Africa because of difficulty to 
compensate losses of nutrients essential to maintain or increase production. To date where 
conservation of natural resources is in the heart of international debate, the major challenge 
for these countries is still transformation of subsistence agriculture to ensure reproduction of 
soil fertility and improve agricultural productivity, a major guarantee for sustainable food 
security. 
 
Over the period 2007-2008, the rise in food prices worldwide has led, in many African 
countries, to multiple events often referred to as "hunger riots". Since that time, one have 
witnessed the introduction of support mechanisms to agricultural producers in some of these 
countries through government credit et inputs subsidies schemes  in order to boost production, 
increase food security and fight against poverty through improvement of farm incomes. 
 
Mali, like many countries, has adopted a strategy of agricultural intensification by setting up a 
support fund for agricultural activities and development of agricultural areas. One of the key 
features of this strategy is the supply of inputs subsidies to facilitate access to pesticides, 
insecticides and other herbicides for a larger number of producers in the growing of rice, 
cotton and other cereals such as maize, sorghum and millet. This initiative comes after period 
where inputs market was driven by liberalization agreements with a mode of supply provided 
by private structures essentially towards cotton and rice production areas. At present, there is 
a supply made in the form of agricultural credits involving farmers’ organizations and 
accompanied by a price subsidy. The supply process involves several actors including: 
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The State: which supported the creation of a National Bank of Agricultural Development and 
ensures development of decentralized financial services, encourages creation and maintenance 
of development agencies to facilitate the supply of inputs and support for producers. 
 
Private structures: playing a leading role in importation and distribution of fertilizers and 
pesticides by passing to foreign firms the calls for tender reflecting the needs of development 
agencies and producers. 
 
Development Agencies or Development projects which have a mission of public services 
consisting in promotion of agricultural development in their zones of intervention.  These 
organizations, in connection with the Direction of the Public Markets, purchase inputs, by call 
for tender to agrochemical firms and to place them at the disposal of the organizations. 
 
Fund and credit agencies:  the function of agricultural credit is provided by the National Bank 
of Agricultural Development and decentralized financing services such as credit and savings 
banks.  
 
Producers and their associations: producers are generally grouped into village associations to 
deal with supply problems. But individual producers can send their input needs through 
associations which convey them to the regulatory or finance companies. Distribution of input 
credits to producers and repayment guarantees are provided by these associations which a 
play important role through the mechanism of joint liability. 
 
The aim of this research is to try to study the link between access to these subsidized credits 
and recipients’ orientation choices towards commercial agriculture.  
 
One can first imagine that this subsidy policy is an incentive for farmers as it would lead, 
through easy access to credit, to an increase in the use of inputs within the framework of 
intensification of food and cash crops productions. One can make assumption that a farmer 
who subscribes to this credit is motivated by a profitability concerns. So he will have the 
motivation to invest in high yielding crop varieties and more financially profitable. Thus, 
access to inputs credit could influence farmer’ crop choices and therefore his land allocation 
behavior between different crops.  
 
In corollary credit can also act on agricultural incomes from sales of harvests. Indeed credit 
being regarded as a factor of improvement of productivity; recipient can record an increase in 
his possibility of sales because of the surplus of production generated by this improvement. 
The surplus on consumption is determined as the supplement of production obtained after 
considering the quantity corresponding to the household subsistence threshold. In this sense, 
we think that credit access can contribute to increase in the degree of commercialization of 
farm households. This is the fundamental assumption we try to test empirically by adopting an 
econometric approach linking access to credit and land allocation. Also we test the impact of 
credit on cash incomes obtained from the sales of agricultural products. The remainder of the 
paper is organized as follows: section 1 presents the conceptual and theoretical framework of 
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the study. In the second section, we present data and descriptive statistics. Section 3 is 
devoted to the presentation of the econometric models and in the 4th section, we discuss 
results followed by the conclusion. 
 
1. Conceptual framework and literature review 
We depart from the theoretical framework proposed by Chambers and Just (1989) considering 
a farmer producing 𝑛 varieties of crops by a combination of a quantity of variable inputs 𝑥 
and an agricultural surface 𝑠 considered as fixed. One supposes an absence of joint production 
in inputs uses but possible reallocation of 𝑠 between crops. In this configuration, the decision 
of farmer is characterized by two stages. In the first stage, he maximizes his profit on each 
type of crops conditionally to fixed quantity of input 𝑠 so to determine profit accruing to each 
crop. And in the second stage, he allocates in an optimal way 𝑠 in order to obtain profit 
function aggregating all crop choices. So given the production possibility frontier for a crop i, 
𝑄𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖) = {𝑞𝑖: (𝑥
𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖) → 𝑞𝑖}, 
Possibility frontier for all crop is given by the following expression: 
𝑄(𝑥, 𝑠) = {𝑞: 𝑞𝑖 ∈ 𝑄
𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖); ∑𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑥 ;∑ 𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝑠;   𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
} 
Where 𝑞𝑖 represents the optimal output corresponding to the crop i, 𝑥
𝑖 optimal quantity of 
variable inputs necessary to obtain this output. 𝑠𝑖 is the fraction of 𝑠 allocable to the 
production of i. Profit function associate with each crop is then expressed as follow: 
 𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠
𝑖) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑝𝑖𝑦𝑖 − 𝑝𝑥𝑥
𝑖: 𝑞𝑖 ∈ 𝑄
𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑠𝑖)}          (1) 
Where 𝑝𝑖 represents the price of output i and 𝑝𝑥 the prices vector of variable inputs 𝑥
𝑖. We 
suppose, for the moment that, variable inputs prices’ vector includes labor remunerated at 
wage price and other inputs including seeds and fertilizers purchased at market prices. 
Relation (1) defines individual profit (or quasi-rent) associated with each crop. And 
maximization program of the farmer makes it possible to determine optimal quantities of 
variable inputs 𝑥𝑖 and corresponding quantities of output for crop i. Thus we have: 
𝑞𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠
𝑖) =
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖,𝑝𝑥,𝑠
𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖
                               (1𝑎) 
     𝑥𝑗
𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠
𝑖) = −
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖,𝑝𝑥,𝑠
𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑥𝑖
        𝑗 = 1,… . ,𝑚      (1𝑏) 
The maximization of the multicrop profit function is translated in relation (2) 
 𝜋(𝑝, 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠1,….𝑠𝑚
{∑𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠
𝑖):
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠
𝑛
𝑖=1
}                      (2) 
This relation leads to deduct the optimal quantities associated with each variable inputs and 
corresponding output. These quantities are expressed as follow: 
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 𝑥𝑗(𝑝, 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠) = −
𝜕𝜋(𝑝, 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠)
𝜕𝑝𝑥𝑗
= −∑
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑥 , ?̃?
𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑𝑥𝑗
𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥 , ?̃?
𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
   𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝑚            (2𝑎) 
                            
 𝑞𝑖(𝑝, 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠) =
𝜕𝜋(𝑝, 𝑝𝑥 , 𝑠)
𝜕𝑝𝑖
=
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥 , ?̃?
𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 𝑞(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥 , ?̃?
𝑖)                     𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑛             (2𝑏)     
 
Where  𝑠𝑖 represents the interior solution corresponding to the optimal surface dedicated to 
crop i in the maximization of multicrop profit function.   𝑥𝑗(𝑝, 𝑝𝑥, 𝑠) and  𝑦𝑖(𝑝, 𝑝𝑥, 𝑠) 
represent respectively quantity of variable inputs and corresponding optimal quantity of 
output. Farmer allocates agricultural surface between crops in manner to equalize their 
marginal profit (first order conditions). Thus we have : 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑥 , ?̃?
𝑖)
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝑖
=
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑥 , ?̃?
1)
𝜕𝑠𝑗
1       𝑖 = 2, … . , 𝑛 ; 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘 
Within this analytical framework, producer is regarded as a rational agent taking into account, 
in his production decision, both inputs prices and outputs prices to then determine an optimal 
allocation of productive factors. That shows that it is likely that he could be influenced, in his 
production choices, by market prices in particular those of outputs.  
But according to Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), small farmers in the developing countries, 
often organized at household level, have specifity to integrate in their decisions both 
production, consumption and reproduction along time. According to these authors, the 
production decisions are generally semi-commercial. Even if markets function well, 
agricultural production is sold only when subsistence needs are met. In this case, household 
can be modeled as an agent solving two separate problems: the first is a profit maximization 
problem and the second is a utility maximization problem with focus on household 
consumption. Without loss of generality, we suppose that agricultural household is a single 
decision maker integrating the possibility of labor supply but also consumption of leisure. 
With this hypothesis, the structural form of the household maximization program can be 
rewritten as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝑐𝑎 , 𝑐𝑚, 𝑐𝑙 , ℎ)                                        : Utility function 
𝐺(𝑞𝑎, 𝑥, 𝑤1, 𝑠) = 0                                          : Production function 
𝑝𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑚𝑐𝑚 = 𝑝𝑎(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑐𝑎) + 𝜔(𝑤2 −𝑤1)  :Budget constraint (cash constraint) 
𝑐𝑙 +𝑤2 = 𝐸                                                    : Time constraint 
 
Where  𝑐𝑎, 𝑐𝑚, 𝑐𝑙, represent respectively consumption of agricultural goods evaluated at the 
price 𝑝𝑎, consumption of manufactured goods purchased at the market price 𝑝𝑚 and 
consumption of leisures and others domestic activities evaluated at the wage rate 𝜔. 
𝐺(. ) represents production function of quantity 𝑞𝑎 of agricultural goods by combination of 
variable inputs 𝑥 and fixed inputs 𝑠.  𝑤1 and 𝑤2 are respectively productive labor and 
household labor supply in or out-farm remunerated at wage rate 𝜔. 𝐸 represents household 
total available time (or time endowment) and ℎ household characteristics. 
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According to Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), if markets function perfectly and that all prices 
are exogenous and transactions cost are negligible, production choices, consumption and labor 
supply are taking according to the opportunity costs. Under these conditions, it is out of 
importance that household sells its production to buy other goods for consumption or it uses 
its labor force for production or that it sells it on the market. Thus under separability 
hypothesis, household decisions are made sequentially. First by profit maximization and then 
by the maximization of consumption and leisure according to the level of profit achieved 
(separability of decisions). Thus the optimal situation can be presented as follow: 
 
𝜋∗ = 𝜋∗(𝑝𝑎 , 𝑝𝑥 , 𝜔, 𝑠)                              : Maximum profit 
𝑐𝑎 = 𝑐𝑎(𝑝𝑎 , 𝑝𝑚, 𝜔, ℎ, 𝑦
∗)                        : Consumption of agricultural goods 
𝑐𝑚 = 𝑐𝑚(𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑚, 𝜔, ℎ, 𝑦
∗)                      : Consumption of manufactured goods 
𝑐𝑙 = 𝑐𝑙(𝑝𝑎 , 𝑝𝑚, 𝜔, ℎ, 𝑦
∗)                         : Consumption of leisures 
with  𝑦∗ = 𝑝𝑎𝑞𝑎 − 𝑝𝑥𝑥 − 𝜔𝑤1 +𝜔𝐸          : Full incomes constraint. 
 
These equilibrium conditions require an absence of market imperfections and a complete 
absence of transactions costs concerning goods and factors. However there may be a number 
of imperfections characterizing economic environment, in particular information asymmetry, 
market absence, difficult access to geographical zone, lack of infrastructures etc. Thus 
difficulties related to transactions costs, low local market size, price risks and risk aversion 
are main sources of market imperfections facing rural farmers. 
But one of the major causes of market imperfections evoked by authors remains the difficulty 
of access to credit. Indeed, seasonal variation in agricultural expenditures and incomes 
implies that household must face both a constraint of annual income equilibrium but also a 
constraint to balance its agricultural budget. With a limited or non-existent access to credit, 
budget balance especially becomes a major constraint when expenditures are high for the 
purchase of inputs. Consequently, credit constraint can limit the optimal production or can 
acts on consumption choices. The behavioral changes induced by these imperfections 
translate in the household maximization program and Lagrangian associated with this 
program is presented as follows: 
𝐿 = 𝑈(𝑐, ℎ) + 𝜆 [∑?̅?𝑖(𝑞𝑖 + 𝐸𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑖∈𝑇
] + 𝜂 [∑ ?̅?𝑖(𝑞𝑖 + 𝐸𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) + 𝐾
𝑖∈𝑇𝐶
] + 𝜙𝐺(𝑞, 𝑠) + ∑ 𝜇𝑖(𝑞𝑖 + 𝐸𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑖∈𝑁𝑇
 
Where 𝑇 indicates the set of tradable goods in reference to the literature on trade theory, 𝑇𝐶 
the set tradable goods subject to credit constraint and 𝑁𝑇 the set non-tradable goods. ?̅?𝑖 is the 
effective exogenous price of good 𝑖 on the market and 𝐾 represents access to credit. 
Given credit constraint and market imperfections, farmer is facing implicit prices defined by 
the following relations: 
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𝑝𝑖
∗ = ?̅?𝑖                          : If good 𝑖 is tradable and non constrained by credit. 
𝑝𝑖
∗ = ?̅?𝑖 (1 +
𝜂
𝜆
)             : If good 𝑖 is constrained by credit. 
𝑝𝑖
∗ =
𝜇𝑖
𝜆
                           : If good 𝑖 is non tradable. 
 
𝜆 represents marginal utility procured by cash earning from crop selling. 𝜇𝑖 is marginal utility 
in endowment in non tradable goods and  𝜂 marginal utility of credit. 
Given the presence of tradable and non tradable goods, farmer production decision is taking 
regarding implicit prices vector 𝑝∗. Thus, the solution considering credit constraint is as 
follow: 
 
𝑞 = 𝑞(𝑝∗, 𝑠)                               : Production choice 
𝜋∗ = ∑𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑖                                  : Profit Maximization 
𝑐 = 𝑐(𝑝∗, 𝑦∗, ℎ)                          : Consumption demand 
           where   𝑦∗ = 𝜋∗ + ∑𝑝𝑖
∗
𝑖
𝐸𝑖 +
𝜂
𝜆
𝐾             : Full incomes constraint 
It follows from this analysis that credit constraint is one of the major factors influencing 
household production and consumption choices. That leads authors to conclude that demand 
of any good entering in credit constraint to loosen or tighten is influenced by the value of 
credit through its price. Hence household will tend to produce or sell more goods aiming at 
loosening constraint. And conversely, for goods requiring credit like fertilizers, it will tend to 
purchase less when implicit value of credit is high. 
These theoretical results highlight the central role of market in inputs demand and outputs 
commercialization. However the concept of agricultural commercialization remains very 
complex regarding multiple studies realized on this subject. Some authors have shown that 
agricultural commercialization in smallholders is a long process beginnig by transformation of 
subsistence agriculture in a semi-commercial then in a fully commercialized agriculture. 
According to Pingali and Rosegrant (1995), in subsistence agriculture, the primary objective 
of farmer remains food self-sufficiency. In subsistence agriculture, farmer combines, in his 
production process, essentially non tradable inputs and goods locally generated by household. 
But in a semi-commercialized agriculture, inputs are obtained by a combination of non-
tradable and tradable goods. While in purely commercialized agriculture, inputs are mainly 
purchased from market and the objective of farmer remains profit maximization. 
Although it seems commonly accepted in the literature that commercialization contributes to 
well-being improvement in rural area, serious difficulties remain about classification of 
farmers according to their degree of commercialization. Some studies such as Janvry et 
al.(1991) or Fafchamps (1992) propose a distinction based on food crops and cash crops. For 
these authors, allocation of household resources to these various types of crops can reflect the 
degree of commercialization. But distinction between food crops and commercial is still very 
far from achieving unanimity. Some are focused on the nature of the crop (food or non-food) 
or on the orientation (intended to be sold on the market or not) and others consider the 
proportion of household production sold on market. In this regard, several indicators have 
been proposed to measure the degree of commercialization of farm households. 
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von Braun et al.(1994) consider 3 types of indicators of commercialization. The first index 
measures the proportion of outputs and inputs bought on market to the total value of 
household production. Second index suggested is defined as the ratio of total of goods and 
services bought on market and household total incomes. The third indicator is related to the 
level household financial integration measured as the ratio of total cash transactions and 
household total incomes. Unlike the second indicator, this third indicator is interested only in 
household cash transactions while in the second, are taken into account all payments in 
natures. 
Strasberg et al.(1999) use the HCI (Household Commercialization Index) which is the gross 
value of crop sales on the gross value of agricultural production. For theses authors, when 
HCI=0 means that household is entirely directed towards self-sufficiency. And when HCI→1 
means very high degree of commercialization. Gabre-Madhin et al.(2007) propose some 
extensions of these preceding indices and add two additional indicators. The first is MP index 
(Market Position) made up of AMP (Absolute Market Position) and NMP (Net Market 
Position). Household market position is defined as the ratio of total volume of purchases and 
sales to the total volume of stock. The total volume of stock is defined as the total of 
inventoried stocks from one season to another. The second index is the household 
specialization index which measures the ratio of the total value of products purchased in 
market but non produced by household to the gross value of household production. This index 
aims to see how household is specialized in its production highlighting its comparative 
advantages. This makes it possible to see how household behaves in the production of goods 
for which it is more efficient and in the purchase of goods for which it is less efficient in the 
production. 
This review helps to understand smallholder behaviors in their profit maximization process. It 
also highlights the effect market imperfections on these behaviors while credit access is 
considered as a factor limiting these imperfections. Based on these theoretical foundations, 
one supposes that access to inputs credits considered as a mean to limit market imperfections 
and to improve agricultural productivity, it can encourages farmer to orient his choices 
towards productions with high yields. This change in behavior results in an optimal allocation 
of agricultural surfaces and an increase in incomes from the sale of agricultural surplus. In an 
attempt to measure degree of commercialization, the different varieties of crop have been 
classified in 3 main groups: food crops, semi-commercial crops and purely commercial crops. 
It is considered that allocation of agricultural surfaces between these 3 groups can constitute a 
good indicator for degree of commercialization. This approach is then supported by 
considering the total amount of sales reported by household. Indeed, regarding the various 
indicators previously presented, ours remain however limited due to lack data relative to 
household total production.  
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2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Data come from a household survey conducted by CERDI in Mali over the period April-May 
2011 in the perspective of Impact Evaluation of the Multifunctional Platforms Program in 
Mali. Agricultural information were collected on households’ like the number of plots, the 
total agricultural surface, inputs uses, modes of procurement in inputs, main cultivated crops 
and crop sales. In total, 2412 households were interviewed and approximately 51% of them 
received subsidized inputs credit granted by various actors in agricultural sector under cover 
of central government. 
In the analysis, crops are classified in 3 different groups: cereals group, the group of roots, 
tubers, vegetables and fruits and the group of cotton and jatropha. These groups are defined 
on the basis of their role in feeding habits but also according to their character relatively 
commercial.  
Cereals such as millet, sorghum, rice as well as corn represent the main crops grown in Mali 
and constitute households’ feeding base. Unlike other types of crops such as vegetables, fruits 
and cotton, cereals are likely to be sold only when household subsistence level is reached. On 
the other hand, products such as tubers, even if they occupy an important place in feeding 
needs, can be directly produced for market commercialization. This is mainly for two reasons. 
First, these crops can easily be cash-converted because of their relative scarcity. Second 
reason is that they do not have a storage life comparing to cereals which can be stored in the 
attics until next season. In contrast cotton or jatropha, are purely commercial crops. For these 
differences, it appears necessary to make some distinction regarding preceding two categories. 
The idea would be finally to see, according to these 3 types of crops, what is the role of credit 
on farmer behaviors.  
The following table provides information on the sample considered. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean SD Min Max obs 
Farmers characteristics   
Farm size (in hectares) 7.85 6.46  0.125 56.75 2318 
% Households reporting cereals as main crop 68.59   ---  ---  --- 1654 
% Households reporting cotton/jatropha as main crop 25.75   ---  ---  --- 621 
% Households reporting Tubers, vegetables or fruits as main crop 05.65   ---  ---  --- 136 
% Households receiving input credit 50.95   ---  ---  --- 1229 
% Households selling a part of its harvest 40.09  ---  ---  --- 967 
Number of households 2412  ---  ---  --- 2412 
Land allocation behavior    
Households not receiving credit 
    
 % acreage allocated to cereals 0.84 0.22 0.00 1.00 1137 
% acreage allocated to tubers, vegetables or fruits 0.15  0.21 0.00 1.00 1137 
% acreage allocated to cotton/jatropha 0.009 0.05 0.00 1.00 1137 
Households receiving credit 
    
 % acreage allocated to cereals 0.71 0.19 0.00 1.00 1181 
% acreage allocated to tubers, vegetables or fruits  0.17 0.18 0.00 1.00 1181 
% acreage allocated to cotton/jatropha 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.86 1181 
Households reporting cereals as main crop 
    
 % acreage allocated to cereals 0.78 0.19 0.11 1.00 1590 
% acreage allocated to tubers, vegetables or fruits 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.87 1590 
% acreage allocated to cotton/jatropha 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.86 1590 
Households reporting cotton/jatropha as main crop 
    
 % acreage allocated to cereals  0.58 0.04 0.54 0.61 597 
% acreage allocated to tubers, vegetables or fruits  0.10 0.01 0.09 0.11 597 
% acreage allocated to cotton/jatropha 0.31 0.05  0.27 0.36 597 
Households reporting  tubers, vegetables or fruits as main crop 
    
 % acreage allocated to cereals 0.42 0.39 0.00  0.96 131 
% acreage allocated to tubers, vegetables or fruits  0.56  0.40  0.03 1.00 131 
% acreage allocated to cotton/jatropha  0.008 0.03 0.00 0.13 131 
Average amount of credit received (x 1000 in CFA) 251.10 511.4 6.000 5205.5 1229 
Cash earning from harvest selling (x 1000 in CFA)   
Earning from selling of  Cereals  403.3 696.4 4 4750 218 
Earning from selling of  Cotton or jatropha  1150 981.5  300 2000 673 
Earning from selling of  Tubers, vegetables or fruits   239.7 355.6 30 1250 179 
Total  402.7 691.4 4 4750 1016 
1$US=456.52CFA in average over survey period 
 
We first see on this table that 50.9% of interviewed households report having received credit 
of agricultural inputs. In growing season, average amount of credit received is about 251.1 
thousands CFA with a very high dispersion from 6 thousands CFA to 5. 205 million CFA. 
 
Concerning agricultural activities, the average farm size exploited is 7.85 hectares and 
approximately 69% of households report cereals as main crop. Slightly more than quarters of 
households cultivate cotton as their main crop and only 5.6% of households report having 
main crops constituted of tubers, vegetables defined in regard to classification previously 
evoked. 
 
On the side of land allocation, we see that households not receiving credit allocate about 84% 
of their agricultural surface to cereals crops, 15% to tubers, vegetables and fruits and only 
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0.9% to purely commercial crops (cotton, jatropha). When we look at these proportions 
among households receiving credit, we find that the share of cereals is relatively lower than in 
the first group (71%) although cereals still dominant. We note however that the share of 
commercial crops is very high in this group, 11% of agricultural surfaces while no clear 
differences emerge with respect to intermediate crops (15% and 17%). 
 
These statistics above show a significant difference in land allocation to cereals and cotton 
cultivations. This first result can be explained by the fact that, as 25% of households are 
cotton farmers, they might have an easy access to credit than other farmers. One can think so 
because there is a strong reverse causality between access to credit and cotton cultivation. In 
other words, “a farmer has credit because he cultivates cotton and reversely he cultivates 
cotton because he has credit”. But the role of credit can go beyond this simple correlation. For 
example a farmer can borrow credit on motive of cotton cultivation, but he may decide to use 
part of this credit in cereals production and other crops. For example in the case of inputs such 
as fertilizers and herbicides, a farmer can use both on cotton field and elsewhere to fertilize or 
maintain others crops. In this context, a better comprehension of land allocation behaviors 
requires adopting an econometric approach trying to control this apparent causality. 
 
When we turn to land allocation between different groups of crops previously defined, we 
note in Table 1 that households reporting cereals as main crop give little place to cotton 
cultivation. On the other hand households cultivating cotton on principal basis allocate a 
significant part of their surface to cereal growing. This seems to reflect a certain form of 
hedge against risk by diversifying their agricultural activities. We note that in the first group 
the shares of agricultural land space allocated to cereals and to cotton are respectively 78% 
and 6%. While in the second group, these proportions are respectively 58% and 31%. That 
shows well that even in households where main reported crop is cotton, more than half of 
agricultural surface are devoted to cereals production. When we look at the side of household 
producing mainly vegetables, tubers and fruits, we note that the cotton cultivation still very 
marginal and is about 0.8% of total surface with a maximum of 13% observed. In this group 
composed predominantly of vegetable growers, distribution of surface is done mainly with 
cereals which occupy about 42%. 
 
These statistics give a general overview on households land allocation behavior regarding 
their credit access status and main crops. However, these statistics may contain a certain limit 
which is necessary to note. Indeed, in the rural households, reported agricultural surfaces are 
likely to be subject to mixed crops system, a farming system generally composed of a 
principal crop and a secondary crop. Agricultural statistics tools can help to determine 
intensity and yield of each crop on the piece by means of agricultural survey. Unfortunately, 
this was not the objective of this survey. In this situation, not being able to provide accurate 
information about secondary crops, analysis is limited to principal crop representing which 
annual production is the highest. Nevertheless, in the remaining of analysis, no significant 
loss of information occurs because we are interested in sales of agricultural product. At this 
level, the concept of principal and secondary crops on a given piece of land loses relevance 
since we are focusing on the total sales of harvests and this no matter their nature. 
 
In this regard, we noted in Table 1 that 40% of households report selling at least part of their 
harvests and sales yield on average 402.7 thousands CFA a year but with a very large 
variability in the sample going from 6 thousands to 4.750 million CFA. Obviously, highest 
incomes are realized from sales of cotton and jatropha which yield on average 1.150 million 
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CFA/year and represent about 3 times incomes from sales of cereals (302.3 thousands 
CFA/year) while sales of vegetables products yield approximately 239.7 thousands CFA. 
Given gross returns of these various crops, can credit access influence farmers’ agricultural 
choices? Trying to give a descriptive answer to this question, one can take the ratio income-
credit for each type of crop. This ratio can be a simple way to measure performance or 
productivity of credit. Thus, farmer, being considered as a rational agent, could readjust his 
choices according to this productivity. That is the assumption on which is based our 
theoretical approach. And the purpose of the econometric section is to test empirically validity 
of this intuition. 
 
3. Econometric models and estimation methods 
As the objective is to try to measure the effect of credit access on the recipients’ behaviors in 
land allocation and market orientation, we develop two econometric models to measure 
separately impact on production process through land allocation and impact which can 
observed through sales of agricultural products. 
3.1 Credit and land allocation behaviors 
Relation between access to credit and allocation of agricultural surfaces is tested by first 
determining share in total surface occupied by each type of crop reported by household. This share 
is calculated as the proportion of total surface farmer dedicates to each crop group. This 
calculation leads to form a system of three equations specified econometrically by relation (3): 
𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗         𝑖 = 1,… . , 𝑁;  𝑗 = 1,2,3                (3) 
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑗 represents proportion of total acreage farmer 𝑖 dedicates to crop group 𝑗. Variable 
𝑇𝑖 represents inputs credit, 𝑋𝑖 household characteristics and those of its economic 
environment and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 stochastic errors. 
Several variables are included in the model to control for other factors likely to influence 
surface allocation. These variables are essentially suggested in literature and encompass 
household characteristics: age of household head, his years of schooling, household size, 
number of children under 12 years, household dependency ratio, main used agricultural 
equipments. They also variables concerning villages characteristics in particular distance to 
the nearest market, local market size measured by the number of inhabitants in the village. We 
also add distances to paved and laterite roads considered as good indicators of village 
accessibility. 
Endogeneity of credit 
Credit access appears strongly endogenous. As mentioned in the descriptive section, there 
may be a reverse causality between credit and land allocation. Moreover, credits are generally 
distributed by financing institutions with a strong involvement of villages associations and 
agricultural cooperatives which provide guarantees through joint liability. And individual 
producers must submit their needs via these producers’ organizations which can decide to 
support or not these individual requests. This generates a form of selection or endogeneity in 
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credit access. One way to deal with this problem is the use of instrumental variable approach. 
Challenge is then to find an instrument which explains land allocation only through its effect 
on credit. 
In the literature some studies such as Ricker-Gilbert (2008) and Godvin (2011) try, in their 
estimations, to correct endogeneity of credit by using instrumental variable method. On 
households data in Ghana, Godvin (2011) uses household distance from to the source of 
information on program of credit. More precisely, he uses distance between household 
residence and the point of distribution of credit vouchers. For this, he supposes that 
households that are too distant from the points of distribution are less likely to have credit 
because of difficulty to access information on program of credit. On the other side, in Malawi, 
credit distribution is essentially seen as a local management concern. That is why Ricker-
Gilbert (2008) uses as instrument for credit access, household residence duration in village i.e. 
number of years since household lives in the village. According to author, residence duration 
can determines household socio-political capital which is often necessary to get credit. 
According to him, household which has a socio-political tenure in village is more socially 
connected and has a certain influence making. Thus this household can easily get credit 
relatively to others that are less connected. 
In this study, we use an instrument relatively similar to that of Ricker-Gilbert (2008). It is 
household participation in community interest works in village. One can think that household 
which participates regularly in community activities such as labor supply for construction of a 
public edifice in the village (school, health center …) or regular participation in social and 
cultural activities, acquires a good reputation and renown in the village. Good reputation in 
village could lead to confidence which is largely necessary in credit contracts. Thus 
household, participating in community works develops and weaves a social network which 
can include any potential village decision maker responsible for distribution of credit. 
Consequently, whether member of agricultural cooperative or not, this household is more 
likely to obtain credit relatively to a household that is not sufficiently involved in community 
activities.  Validity of this instrument is examined and results of tests are provided in Table 2 
obtained from instrumentation equations related to the first stages of estimations results. 
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Table 2 Summary results for first-stage regressions 
 
Probability of receiving 
credit(Probit) 
  
Amount of credit received 
(OLS) 
  Coef. Std.Err. P>|t|   Coef. Std.Err. P>|t| 
Age household head -0.0043 (0.0032) 0.17  -0.0009 (0.0028) 0.747 
Year schoolling househ head -0.0231 (0.0126) 0.067  -0.0035 (0.0196) 0.860 
Household size 0.0211 (0.0232) 0.364  -0.0283 (0.0353) 0.423 
Nber children under 12 -0.0021 (0.0494) 0.966  0.1472 (0.0609) 0.017 
Household Dependancy ratio -0.0928 (0.1103) 0.400  -0.3453 (0.1455) 0.019 
Agricultural cooperative in village 0.2159 (0.1079) 0.045  0.1697 (0.2185) 0.438 
Participate in Community work in the village 0.2714 (0.1135) 0.017  0.5223 (0.1657) 0.002 
Participate in economic interest group 0.1683 (0.1489) 0.258  0.5057 (0.3473) 0.147 
Use of animal traction 0.4598 (0.1293) 0.000  0.6483 (0.1893) 0.001 
Use of tractor machine 0.8630 (0.2954) 0.003  3.0284 (1.2009) 0.012 
Distance to market 0.0058 (0.0073) 0.424  0.0061 (0.0075) 0.415 
Local market size(population village) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.567  0.0001 (0.0001) 0.232 
Distance to paved road -0.0047 (0.0017) 0.006  -0.0027 (0.0018) 0.135 
Distance to laterite road 0.0080 (0.0046) 0.085  0.0019 (0.0046) 0.683 
Dummy Region 2 0.9820 (0.2071) 0.000  0.2638 (0.1159) 0.024 
Dummy Region 3 0.3073 (0.2330) 0.187  -0.0527 (0.1550) 0.734 
Dummy Region 4 1.1608 (0.2016) 0.000  0.2481 (0.1662) 0.137 
Dummy Region 5 2.0767 (0.1881) 0.000  1.6125 (0.3523) 0.000 
Constante -2.0619 (0.3016) 0.000   -0.9632 (0.3084) 0.002 
Inverse Mills Ratio ----- ----- -----  0.8331 (0.4787) 0.086 
Nber obs     2197      2142 
PseudoR2/R2   0.365    0.175 
Chi2(18)/ F(19,200)   403.1    9.250 
Prob>Chi2/Prob>F    0.000      0.000 
Excluded instrument : Participate in Community work in the village    
 Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instrument: F(1, 200)= 15.51  Prob> F =  0.0001 
Kleibergen-Paap Underidentification test : Chi-sq(1)=13.52  P-val=0.0002 
   Kleibergen-Paap Weak identification test using Stock-Yogo critical values F=15.51>8.96( 15% LIML size ) 
Hansen overidentification test  P.value= 0.000 (equation just identified)       
Robust standard errors adjusted for 201 clusters(villages) 
      
In addition to household participation in community work variable which meets exclusion and 
orthogonality conditions, other factors seem to influence access to credit. In first, we note that 
presence of agricultural cooperative acts positively on the probability of access to credit even if its 
influence on the amount of credit is not significant. It also appears that producers using 
agricultural machineries (animal traction and machine tractor) have a very high probability of 
access to credit and a high possibility of having a very high amount. These results are significant 
at least at the maximum error of 5%. Distance to paved road seems to influence negatively the 
probability of access to credit but not significant effect is observed on the received amount. But 
this result is nuanced by influence related to laterite road which shows a significantly positive 
effect on the probability of access to credit at 10% level. However results concerning these 
accessibility variables should be interpreted with some restraint because they are not fulfilling 
exclusion conditions as they are variables supposed to act on both access to credit and the left 
hand side variable. Same situation occurs regarding years of schooling of household head which 
seems negatively correlated with participation in the program of credit at 10% level. 
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Concerning the validity test of excluded instrument, we find that participation in community 
activities seems to be a good instrument. Indeed, this variable is positively and significantly 
correlated with the probability of receiving credit at 5% and correlated with the amount of credit at 
1%. For its validity, the Angrist-Pischke exclusion test provides a F-stat equal to 15.51 exceeding 
the ad hoc threshold of 10 tabulated by Staiger and Stock (1997). This leads to rejection of weak 
identification hypothesis at 1% (hypothesis of weak instrument). Relaxing i.i.d hypothesis on 
errors and retaining cluster structure of data, the F-test suggested by Kleibergen and Paap (2006), 
obtained by modification that of Cragg-Donald (1993), seems more appropriate to test instruments 
weakness in clustered sample. Results of this test give a F=15.51 which is higher than 8.96 
corresponding to the size of maximum distortion at 15% level in a LIML estimation according to 
Stock and Yogo (2005) tabulation. This leads to reject once more the null hypothesis of weak 
identification. These first tests are then supported by the LM test of Kleibergen-Paap testing the 
underidentification hypothesis. Given preceding results, results of this test would be obvious. But 
this time, the approach consists to test the rank of coefficient matrix of the reduced form of 
structural equation expressed in function of excluded instrument. Under hypothesis of 
underidentification, the rank of this matrix is 𝑅 = 𝐾 − 1 where 𝐾 is the number of endogenous 
variables(𝐾 = 1). Hence, it is to test 𝑅 = 0. Under the null, this statistic is distributed as a Chi2 
with 𝐿 − 𝐾 + 1 degrees of freedom. Where 𝐿 is the number of excluded instruments(𝐿 = 1). Given 
the Pvalue associated with this test we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level. However, 
given the uniqueness of excluded instrument, the Hansen test of overidentification is not 
conclusive. So the equation of credit remains just identified, but it appears to be technically 
adequate regarding identification condition. 
This control of endogeneity of credit allows adding an identification equation to the econometric 
specification defined by equation (3) to thereby form a system of structural equations presented in 
the following form: 
{
 
 
𝑆1𝑖 = 𝛽01 + 𝛽11𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽21𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖1      
𝑆2𝑖 = 𝛽02 + 𝛽12𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖2       
𝑆3𝑖 = 𝛽03 + 𝛽13𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽23𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖3        
𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽04 + 𝛽14𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽24𝑍𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖4       
𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑁      (4)     
This system is estimated by adopting the 3SLS procedure. The choice of 3SLS is particularly due 
to the fact that it gives possibility to improve estimators. By using residuals of each equation of 
the system to perform a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), it makes it possible to correct 
any form of heterocedasticity and possible correlation of errors. 
By compiling data on the N households in equation (4) we can write the system in a matrix form: 
𝑌 = 𝐻𝛽 + 𝜖   with  𝐸(𝜖𝜖′) = ∑              (4′) 
Where ∑ represents variance-covariance matrix of errors. Each equation in this system (4′) is 
estimated by 2SLS to then determine instrumented values of endogenous variables. This 
instrumented values are grouped in a matrix expressed as follow: 
?̂?𝑗 = 𝑋(𝑋𝑋′)
−1𝑋′𝑍𝑖    𝑗 = 1,… ,4      (5) 
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In the second step we use residual matrix of each equation estimated in first stage to calculate the 
estimated value of ∑ and apply the transformation of Aitken (1935) and then we estimate 
transformed equation by FGLS to determine ?̂?. Thus we have: 
 
∑̂ =
𝜖̂𝜖̂′
𝑁
 
?̂?3𝑆𝐿𝑆 = (?̂?′ (∑̂
−1
 𝐼) ?̂?)
−1
?̂?′ (∑̂
−1
 𝐼) 𝑌        (6) 
Where  𝐼 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁  unitary matrix ,   is  Kronecker product.  
 
The system is first estimated by considering access to credit as a binary variable taking 1 if 
household received credit during crop season and 0 otherwise. Results of this estimation are 
presented in Table 3. The second estimation is performed by replacing access status by 
amount of credit received by farmer. In this estimation, amount of credit is considered 0 for 
households without access to credit. However, this treatment could lead to an estimation bias 
if relevant techniques are not applied to control this systematic selection. For this, we use the 
inverse of Mills Ratio obtained from equation related to the probability of receiving credit. 
This correction factor is generated and introduced into equation of amount of credit to control 
selection bias. Results of estimations with amount of credit are provided in Table 4. 
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Table3: Impact of inputs credit on farmer land allocation 
3SLS  
% of farm acreage 
dedicated to  
Cereals 
 
% dedicated to 
tubers, vegetables 
and fruits 
 
% dedicated 
to cotton or 
jatropha 
 Credit(=1 if receives credit) -0.5645*** -0.0091 0.0656*** 
 
(0.1031) (0.0099) (0.0058) 
Age household head 0.0083** -0.0007** -0.0001 
 
(0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Year schoolling househ head 0.0397** -0.0058*** 0.0018** 
 
(0.0168) (0.0016) (0.0009) 
Household size -0.0108 0.0009 0.0001 
 
(0.0293) (0.0028) (0.0016) 
Nber children under 12 -0.0097 -0.0032 0.0042 
 
(0.0572) (0.0055) (0.0032) 
Household Dependancy ratio 0.1202 -0.0087 -0.0034 
 
(0.1211) (0.0116) (0.0068) 
Agricultural cooperative in village -0.0904 -0.0018 0.0108** 
 
(0.0941) (0.0090) (0.0053) 
Participate in economic interest group -0.0754 0.0109 -0.0034 
 
(0.1774) (0.0169) (0.0099) 
Use of animal traction 0.2822** -0.0397*** 0.0115 
 
(0.1336) (0.0128) (0.0075) 
Use of tractor machine 0.1568 -0.0234 0.0078 
 
(0.3430) (0.0328) (0.0192) 
Distance to market 0.0155*** -0.0011** -0.0005 
 
(0.0053) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
Local market size(population village) 0.0029 -0.0036 0.0007 
 
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0013) 
Distance to paved road 0.0035** -0.0002* -0.0001 
 
(0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Distance to laterite road 0.0042 -0.0005* 0.0001 
 
(0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Dummy Region 2 -0.6211*** 0.0817*** -0.0196** 
 
(0.1649) (0.0158) (0.0092) 
Dummy Region 3 1.7994*** -0.1531*** -0.0269*** 
 
(0.1583) (0.0151) (0.0089) 
Dummy Region 4 0.6051*** -0.0592*** -0.0014 
 
(0.1556) (0.0149) (0.0087) 
Dummy Region 5 -0.6183*** 0.0152 0.0466*** 
 
(0.1584) (0.0151) (0.0089) 
Constante 7.3261*** 0.2704*** -0.0030 
 
(0.2697) (0.0258) (0.0151) 
Observations 2197 2197 2197 
F-stat 39.02 22.37 36.32 
Prob F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.2438 0.1560 0.2309 
Robust clustered standard errors in parenthsesis  adjusted for 201 clusters., ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 4: Impact of amount of credit on farmer land allocation 
3SLS  
% of farm acreage 
dedicated to  
Cereals 
 
% dedicated to 
tubers,vegetables 
and fruits 
 
% dedicated to 
cotton or 
jatropha 
 Amount of credit -0.5268*** -0.1877*** 0.7145*** 
 
(0.0682) (0.0660) (0.0347) 
Amount of credit squared 0.0431*** 0.0140 -0.0571*** 
 
(0.0098) (0.0094) (0.0050) 
Age household head 0.0077** -0.0073** -0.0004 
 
(0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0019) 
Year schoolling househ head 0.0407** -0.0585*** 0.0178** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0086) 
Household size -0.0054 0.0071 -0.0017 
 
(0.0292) (0.0283) (0.0149) 
Nber children under 12 -0.0021 -0.0149 0.0170 
 
(0.0570) (0.0551) (0.0290) 
Household Dependancy ratio 0.1262 -0.1245 -0.0017 
 
(0.1204) (0.1165) (0.0612) 
Agricultural cooperative in village -0.0868 0.0032 0.0836* 
 
(0.0936) (0.0906) (0.0476) 
Participate in economic interest group 0.0268 0.0408 -0.0676 
 
(0.1792) (0.1734) (0.0911) 
Use of animal traction 0.3900*** -0.3841*** -0.0059 
 
(0.1332) (0.1289) (0.0677) 
Use of tractor machine 0.3014 -0.1370 -0.1644 
 
(0.3449) (0.3337) (0.1753) 
Distance to market 0.0156*** -0.0102** -0.0054** 
 
(0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0027) 
Local market size(population village) 0.0028 -0.0030 0.0002 
 
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0012) 
Distance to paved road 0.0036*** -0.0023* -0.0014* 
 
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0007) 
Distance to laterite road 0.0039 -0.0056* 0.0017 
 
(0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0015) 
Dummy Region 2 -0.7381*** 0.8915*** -0.1534* 
 
(0.1651) (0.1598) (0.0839) 
Dummy Region 3 1.7878*** -1.5232*** -0.2645*** 
 
(0.1585) (0.1534) (0.0806) 
Dummy Region 4 0.5751*** -0.5426*** -0.0324 
 
(0.1534) (0.1484) (0.0779) 
Dummy Region 5 -0.4794*** 0.2891* 0.1903** 
 
(0.1538) (0.1488) (0.0782) 
Constante 7.1835*** 2.6652*** 0.1514 
 
(0.2691) (0.2604) (0.1368) 
Observations 2142 2142 2142 
F-stat 37.02  19.78 62.16 
Prob F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.2683 0.1639 0.3811 
Robust clustered standard errors in parenthsesis  adjusted fo 201 clusters., ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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3.2 Access to credit and degree of commercialization 
In this section, we are interested in the impact of credit on total sales of agricultural products. 
As supposed previously, credit is considered as a factor of productivity improvement which 
can translate in an increase in farmer potentiality of sales because of production surplus but 
also in increase in household degree of commercialization. This hypothesis is tested through 
the following econometric specification: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖        𝑖 = 1,… . , 𝑁                 (7) 
Where 𝑌𝑖 represents degree of market participation of household 𝑖. This degree of participation 
is captured by total sales of household agricultural products. 𝑇𝑖 represents credit variable and 
𝑋𝑖 household characteristics and those of its economic environment and 𝑢𝑖 the errors. 
 
Three methods of are proposed to estimate this equation. The first is Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood estimation (LIML). This is a general method defined among k-Class 
estimators with 𝑘 = 𝜆. It includes 2SLS when 𝑘 = 1 and equivalent to OLS when 𝑘 = 0 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). In presence of homoscedasticity, LIML still 
asymptotically equivalent to 2SLS, but, one of the advantages of LIML over 2SLS is that it 
remains invariant to any normalization used in the system and appears adapted in presence of 
a potential weakness of instruments (Greene, 2003; Hahn, Hausman et Kuersteiner, 2004, 
Baum et Schaffer, 2007). Results of this estimation correspond to model 1 in Table 5. 
In descriptive statistics, it was found that only 2 5⁄  of households report having sold part of its 
harvests. This generates a very high frequency of corner solutions. And to attempt to correct 
this problem, we perform the instrumental variable Tobit estimation. This method is 
suggested by Wooldridge (2003) which proposes a Maximum Likelihood Estimation of joint 
distribution of left hand side and endogenous variables conditionally on exogenous variables 
of the system. The results of this regression are presented in the column (2) of Table 5. 
Moreover, to improve analysis, it would be necessary to distinguish effect of credit on 
household orientation choice towards market from effect on degree of participation 
(terminologies used by Moti and Berhanu, 2010). For that, we use Cragg-model or Double-
Hurdle model which provides possibility of separating these two levels of analysis. Indeed 
some households receiving credit report not selling their harvests whereas certain households 
not receiving credit are market oriented. The goal of distinction is simply to be able to 
separate probability of participation in market and degree of commercialization. The Tobit 
model does not give an explanation to corner solutions. It is limited only to explain the 
probability of a positive outcome. 
 
The best alternative, which seems adapted is Double-Hurdle model proposed by Cragg 
(1971). This estimation method explains both probability of observing a positive value and 
effect on quantity[𝑃(𝑌 > 0|𝑋, 𝑍); 𝐸(𝑌|𝑋, 𝑍; 𝑌 > 0)]. Questions now are: what is the 
household’ probability of participation in market according to credit status and what is the 
real effect of credit on degree of commercialization. Cragg (1971) suggests estimating the 
first level by Probit and the second level by a truncated regression in which residuals have a 
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truncated normal distribution. Results of these estimations are presented in Table 5 in the two 
columns of model (3). 
 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of amount of credit on crop selling 
 
(1) (2) Double-Hurdle Model(3) 
Variables LIML IVTOBIT PROBIT TRUNCREG 
Amount of credit 0.5488** 1.5911** 0.1708*** 0.1661*** 
 
(0.2746) (0.8093) (0.0423) (0.0475) 
Age household head 0.0086 0.1588* 0.1463** 0.3584 
 
(0.0247) (0.0818) (0.0636) (0.3895) 
Year schoolling househ head 0.0340* 0.1317** 0.0538 1.3180* 
 
(0.0205) (0.0657) (0.0539) (0.7696) 
Farm size 0.2343*** 0.3573*** 0.0903* -0.0877 
 
(0.0436) (0.1004) (0.0476) (0.0833) 
Household size -0.1275** -0.4132* -0.2624*** -0.3523 
 
(0.0576) (0.2286) (0.1014) (0.3807) 
Farm sizeX Household size 0.0496 0.0156 0.0507 -0.0580 
 
(0.0325) (0.0458) (0.0669) (0.0704) 
Nber children under 12 0.0826** 0.2573** 0.1154** -0.1950*** 
 
(0.0359) (0.1221) (0.0487) (0.0642) 
Household Dependancy ratio -0.1087*** -0.3181** -0.1441** 0.6217 
 (0.0407) (0.1490) (0.0722) (0.4395) 
Agricultural cooperative in village 0.0975** 0.3871** 0.0135 0.5254*** 
 
(0.0460) (0.1848) (0.0160) (0.1867) 
Participate in economic interest group -0.0084 -0.0690 -0.0637 0.0390 
 
(0.0307) (0.0741) (0.0504) (0.2729) 
Use of animal traction -0.0068 -0.0377 -0.0810 1.6451** 
 
(0.0161) (0.0740) (0.0566) (0.6992) 
Use of tractor machine 0.2384** 0.3514** 0.0055 0.6443*** 
 
(0.1168) (0.1466) (0.0651) (0.1520) 
Distance to market -0.0049 -0.2275* -0.0321** -0.4346** 
 
(0.0212) (0.1270) (0.0126) (0.1771) 
Local market size(population village) 0.0642** 0.1068 -0.0082 -0.0382 
 
(0.0277) (0.0675) (0.0505) (0.0760) 
Distance to paved road -0.0046 0.0158 0.1084 -0.9907 
 
(0.0187) (0.1263) (0.0953) (0.8729) 
Distance to laterite road 0.0008 -0.2167* -0.1750 -4.2765* 
 
(0.0149) (0.1136) (0.1068) (2.3784) 
Dummy Region 2 -0.0837 0.3588 0.3294 0.9615 
 
(0.0635) (0.3736) (0.2619) (4.1670) 
Dummy Region 3 -0.0678 -1.5935** -1.0703*** 17.9614*** 
 
(0.0559) (0.6963) (0.4104) (6.0024) 
Dummy Region 4 -0.2713*** 0.1817 0.4321* 2.2503 
 
(0.0819) (0.2852) (0.2604) (3.9241) 
Dummy Region 5 -0.0829 0.0118 -0.1203 3.7522 
 
(0.0831) (0.3517) (0.2438) (3.8963) 
Constante 0.0162 -2.9337*** -1.2528*** -22.8143*** 
 
(0.1207) (0.6610) (0.3190) (5.3494) 
Observations 2142 2142 2142 2142 
F-stat/Chi2 8.01  147.01 101.6 42.09 
Prob>F/Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
R-squared/pseudo R2 0.4192  -------- 0.5049  -------- 
Robust clustered standard errors in parenthsesis , Bootstrap standard errors for model (3), ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1        
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4. Discussion of results and conclusion 
Models we have estimated were improved by introducing other control variables to try to 
capture factors that can influence households land allocation behavior and its degree of 
commercialization. 
First, we find that household characteristics play a central role in agriculture market 
orientation. We noted that age of farm head is positively correlated with the proportion of 
agricultural surface dedicated to cereal crops and negatively correlated with the development 
of intermediate crops. But no significant effect is observed on purely commercial crops. 
Results also show that household heads’ educational level acts positively on both cereal and 
commercial crops but with a negative effect on intermediate crops (Tables 3, 4 and 5). This 
would probably means that most educated household heads are those with a high skills and 
capacity to access and process information related to market situation leading to a form of 
efficiency in the production process 
After controlling for households characteristics, we also find that distance to market 
negatively influences household commercial orientation and degree of commercialization 
(Tables 3, 4 and 5). Results concerning commercial orientation in particular surfaces 
allocation towards market oriented crops, show that distance to market favor cereal crops to 
the detriment of semi-commercializable crops (Tables 3 and 4). But its impact on purely cash 
crops remains ambiguous because effect is not significant in Table 3 and appears negative in 
Table 4. This last result would be rather a reflection of lack of access to information. For 
example, one can think that households that are more distant from markets are those which 
have less access to information related to the evolution of situations concerning cash crops 
market even if these crops are mainly intended for export. A similar result is observed on to 
nearest paved road and substantially on distance to laterite road. These variables, considered 
as village accessibility indicators, tend to favor development of non-tradable crops mainly 
intended for household consumption. Especially these accessibility variables discourage 
growing semi-commercial and purely commercial crops mainly because of transactions costs 
they generate. In this case, as suggested in the literature, distance to market and distances to 
permanent roads are factors that influence negatively commercial orientation and thus degree 
of commercialization of agriculture in rural area. 
Effects of credit 
Concerning impact of inputs credit, results presented in Table 3 show that access to credit 
favors development of cash crops to the detriment of food crops while its effect seems not 
significant on vegetable crops and tubers. This result tends to reinforce our idea that access to 
inputs credit favors land allocation towards high yields crops. But analysis done by 
considering amount of credit shows that beyond simple access to credit, the amount of credit 
has a nonlinear effect on surface allocation (Table 4). Significance of quadratic term of 
amount shows that the amount of credit encourages, at first, cash crops by discouraging food 
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and intermediate crops. And then, an amount of credit sufficiently important leads farmer to 
decrease the share of cash crop to develop food crops. 
This seems rather logical since a very high amount of credit means sufficient availability of 
productive resources that gives possibility to farmer to grow other crops. Consequently 
sufficient availability of resources resulting in an improved productivity leads to a high 
commercialization. This relation is tested in Table 5 where we find that amount of credit acts 
positively on degree of commercialization. This result remains statistically significant at any 
significant level lower than 5%. Thereafter, while trying to distinguish effect of credit on 
commercialization choices from his impact on degree commercialization, one arrives to 
results that not only credit influences farmer orientation choices towards market but also its 
degree of participation in market. 
Despite of the use of relatively rigorous estimations techniques, this study still remains a 
relatively summary attempt because of unavailability of sufficient data for a better analysis of 
effect of such agricultural credit program. Indeed, a more thorough analysis would require to 
have broad and detailed information on program operation. That would allow determination 
of a credible counterfactual group in order to be able to implement more specialized 
techniques. Nevertheless, results of this study suggest encouragement of any initiative aiming 
to promote access to agricultural inputs. This could lead to create conditions of a durable food 
safety and a strong participation of peasantry in market for an effective fight against poverty 
and welfare improvement in rural area. 
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